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a b s t r a c t
We study the speed of convergence to approximately optimal states in two classes of
potential games. We provide bounds in terms of the number of rounds, where a round
consists of a sequence of movements, with each player appearing at least once in each
round.Wemodel the sequential interaction between players by a best-response walk in the
state graph, where every transition in the walk corresponds to a best response of a player.
Our goal is to bound the social value of the states at the end of such walks. In this paper,
we focus on two classes of potential games: selfish routing games, and cut games (or party
affiliation games (Fabrikant et al. 2004 [12])).
Other than bounding the price of anarchy of selfish routing games (Roughgarden
and Tardos, 2002 [25], Awerbuch et al. 2005 [2], Christodoulou and Koutsoupias, 2005
[9]), there are many interesting problems about game dynamics in these games. It is
known that exponentially long best-response walks may exist to pure Nash equilibria
(Fabrikant et al. 2004 [12]), and random best-response walks converge to solutions with
good approximation guarantees after polynomially many best responses (Goemans et al.
2005 [17]). In this paper,we study the speed of convergence ondeterministic best-response
walks in these games and prove that starting from an arbitrary configuration, after one
round of best responses of players, the resulting configuration is a Θ(n)-approximate
solution. Furthermore, we show that starting from an empty configuration, the solution
after any round of best responses is a constant-factor approximation. We also provide a
lower bound for the multi-round case, where we show that for any constant number of
rounds t , the approximation guarantee cannot be better than nϵ(t), for some ϵ(t) > 0.
We also study cut games, that provide an illustrative example of potential games. The
convergence of potential games to locally optimum solutions has been studied in the
context of local search algorithms (Johnson et al. 1988 [19], Schaffer and Yannakakis,
1991 [28]). In these games, we consider two social functions: the cut (defined as theweight
of the edges in the cut), and the total happiness (defined as the weight of the edges in
the cut, minus the weight of the remaining edges). For the cut social function, we prove
that the expected social value after one round of a random best-response walk is at least
a constant factor approximation to the optimal social value. We also exhibit exponentially
long best-response walks with poor social value. For the unweighted version of this cut
game, we proveΩ(
√
n) and O(n) lower and upper bounds on the number of rounds of best
responses to converge to a constant-factor cut. In addition, we suggest a way to modify the
game to enforce a fast convergence in any fair best-response walk. For the total happiness
social function, we show that for unweighted graphs of sufficiently large girth, starting
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from a random configuration, greedy behavior of players in a random order converges to
an approximate solution after one round.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The main tool for analyzing the performance of systems where selfish players interact without central coordination, is
the notion of the price of anarchy in a game [22]; this is the worst case ratio between an optimal social solution and a Nash
equilibrium. Intuitively, a high price of anarchy indicates that the system under consideration requires central regulation to
achieve good performance. On the other hand, a low price of anarchy does not necessarily imply high performance of the
system. Onemain reason for this phenomenon is that inmany games, the repeated selfish behavior of playersmay not lead to
a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, even if the selfish behavior of players converges to a Nash equilibrium, the rate of convergence
might be very slow. Thus, from a practical and computational viewpoint, it is important to evaluate the rate of convergence
to approximate solutions.
By modeling the repeated selfish behavior of the players as a sequence of atomic improvements, the resulting
convergence question is related to the running time of local search algorithms. In fact, the theory of PLS-completeness [28]
and the existence of exponentially longwalks inmany local optimization problems such asMax-2SAT andMax-Cut, indicate
that inmany of these settings, we cannot hope for a polynomial-time convergence to a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, for such
games, it is not sufficient to just study the value of the social function at Nash equilibria. To deal with this issue, we need to
bound the social value of a strategy profile after polynomially many best-response improvements by players.
Potential games are games in which any sequence of improvements by players converges to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Equivalently, in potential games, there is no cycle of strict improvements of players. This is equivalent to the existence of a
potential function that is strictly increasing after any strict improvement. In this paper, we study the speed of convergence
to approximate solutions in two classes of potential games: selfish congestion games and cut games.
1.0.0.1. Related work. This work is motivated by the negative results of the convergence in congestion games [12], and
the study of convergence to approximate solutions games [20,17]. Fabrikant et al. [12] show that for general congestion and
asymmetric selfish routing games, the problemof finding a pureNash equilibrium is PLS-complete. This suggests that is quite
likely that walks to equilibria for these games might be exponentially long. Our model is based on the model introduced by
Mirrokni and Vetta [20] who addressed the convergence to approximate solutions in basic-utility and valid-utility games.
They prove that starting from any state, one round of selfish behavior of players converges to a 1/3-approximate solution in
basic-utility games. Goemans et al. [17] study a new equilibrium concept (i.e. sink equilibria) inspired from convergence on
best-response walks and proved fast convergence to approximate solutions on random best-response walks in (weighted)
congestion games. In particular, their result on the price of sinking of the congestion games implies polynomial convergence
to constant-factor solutions on random best-response walks in selfish routing games with linear latency functions. Other
related papers studied convergence for different classes of games such as load balancing games [11], market sharing
games [16], and distributed caching games [14].
A main subclass of potential games is the class of congestion games introduced by Rosenthal [24]. Monderer and
Shapley [21] proved that congestion games are equivalent to the class of exact potential games. In an exact potential game,
the increase in the payoff of a player is equal to the increase in the potential function. Both selfish routing games and cut
games are a subclass of exact potential games, or equivalently, congestion games. Tight bounds for the price of anarchy are
known for both of these games in different settings [25,2,9,8]. Other than bounding the price of anarchy in these games,
there are many problems about the speed of convergence to approximate solutions.
Two main known results for the convergence of selfish routing games are the existence of exponentially long best-
response walks to equilibria [12] and fast convergence to constant-factor solutions on random best-response walks [17]. To
the best of our knowledge, prior to the conference version of this paper, no results are known for the speed of convergence to
approximate solutions on deterministic best-response walks in the general selfish routing game. Fotakis et al. [15] showed
that weighted congestion games with linear latency functions are potential games. After the conference version of this
paper, some new results have been developed for this problem [3,13,5,7], and we will discuss these follow-up results
at the end of introduction. Preliminary results in some special load balancing games are due to Suri et al. [26,27]. Our
results for general selfish routing games generalize their results, and they are different from the follow-up results discussed
later.
The Max-Cut problem has been studied extensively [18], even in the local search setting. It is well known that finding a
local optimum forMax-Cut is PLS-complete [19,28], and there are some configurations fromwhichwalks to a local optimum
are exponentially long. In the positive side, Poljak [23] proved that for cubic graphs the convergence to a local optimum
requires at most O(n2) steps. The total happiness social function is considered in the context of correlation clustering [4],
and is similar to the total agreement minus disagreement in that context. The best approximation algorithm known for this
problem gives a O(log n)-approximation [6], and is based on a semidefinite relaxation.
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1.0.0.2. Our contribution. Our work deviates from bounding the time needed to reach a Nash equilibrium [28,12], and
focuses in studying the rate of convergence to an approximate solution1 [20,17]. We consider two types of walks of best
responses: random walks and deterministic fair walks. On random walks, we choose a random player at each step. On
deterministic fairwalks, the time complexity of a game ismeasured in terms of the number of rounds, where a round consists
of a sequence of movements, with each player appearing at least once in each round.
First, we give tight bounds for the approximation factor of the solution after one round of best responses of players
in selfish routing games. In particular, we prove that starting from an arbitrary state, the approximation factor after one
round of best responses of players is at most O(n) of the optimum and this is tight up to a constant factor. We extend the
lower bound for the case of multiple rounds, where we show that for any constant number of rounds t , the approximation
guarantee cannot be better than nϵ(t), for some ϵ(t) > 0. On the other hand, we show that starting from an empty state, the
state resulting after one round of best responses is a constant-factor approximation.
We also study the convergence in cut games, that aremotivated by the party affiliation game [12], and are closely related to
the local search algorithm for theMax-Cut problem [28]. In the party affiliation game, each player’s strategy is to choose one
of two parties, i.e, si ∈ {1,−1} and the payoff of player i for the strategy profile (s1, s2, . . . , sn) isj sjsiwij. The weight of an
edge corresponds to the level of disagreement of the endpoints of that edge. This gamemodels the clustering of a society into
two parties that minimizes the disagreement within each party, or maximizes the disagreement between different parties.
We can model the party affiliation game as the following cut game: each vertex of a graph is a player, with payoff its
contribution in the cut (i.e. the total weight of its adjacent edges that have endpoints in different parts of the cut). It follows
that a player moves if he can improve his contribution in the cut, or equivalently, he can improve the value of the cut. Pure
Nash equilibria exist in this game, and selfish behavior of players converges to a Nash equilibrium.
We consider two social functions: the cut and the total happiness, defined as the value of the cut minus the weight of
the rest of edges. First, we prove fast convergence on random walks. More precisely, we prove that selfish behavior of players
in a round in which the ordering of the player is picked uniformly at random, results in a cut that is a 18 -approximation in
expectation. We complement our positive results by examples that exhibit poor deterministic convergence. That is, we show
the existence of fair walks with exponential length, that result in a poor social value. We also model the selfish behavior of
mildly greedy players that move if their payoff increases by at least a factor of 1 + ϵ. We prove that in contrast to the case
of (totally) greedy players, mildly greedy players converge to a constant-factor cut after one round, under any ordering. For
unweighted graphs, we give an Ω(
√
n) lower bound and an O(n) upper bound for the number of rounds required in the
worst case to converge to a constant-factor cut.
Finally, for the total happiness social function, we show that for unweighted graphs of large girth, starting from a random
configuration, greedy behavior of players in a random order converges to an approximate solution after one round. We
remark that this implies a combinatorial algorithmwith sub-logarithmic approximation ratio, for graphs of sufficiently large
girth, while the best known approximation ratio for the general problem is O(log n) [6], and is obtained using semidefinite
programming.
1.0.0.3. Follow-up work. After the conference version of this paper, some related new results have been obtained for
convergence of best-response dynamics in cut games and congestion games. These follow-up results are different from
our results and are discussed below.
Awerbuch et al. [3] study the speed of convergence of (unrestricted) deterministic best-response dynamics to
approximate solutions. They show that after an exponential number of steps of best-response dynamics in congestion games,
the approximation factor of the social value might be a superconstant, even though the price of anarchy is a constant.
This result has the same flavor as our exponential lower bound result for convergence of best-response dynamics in cut
games. They show that this exponential convergence for deterministic best-response dynamics holds even for unweighted
congestion games [3]. More notably, Awerbuch et al. [3] show that for a large class of (exact) potential games including
congestion games and cut games, an (unrestricted) α-best-response dynamics2 in which each player gets a chance to play
after at most t steps converges to a solution whose approximation factor is arbitrarily close to the price of anarchy of the
corresponding game. This result is inspired by our result about convergence of one round of mildly greedy players for cut
games stated in Theorem 11.3 Furthermore, Fanelli et al. [13] gave rigorous bounds on the approximation factor of the
solution after k rounds of best responses of players. Finally, Bilò et al. [5] came upwith amatching lower bound of Theorem2.
On the topic of convergence time to equilibria, Chien and Sinclair [7] showed that in symmetric4 congestion games,
α-approximate players (or mildly greedy players) reach an α-approximate Nash equilibrium5 in polynomial time when
the delay functions satisfy some mild bounded-jump conditions. On the contrary, Skopalik and Vöcking [29] showed
1 That is to a solution that approximates the optimal one, for some given objective.
2 In anα-best-response dynamics, players change their strategy only if they can improve their payoff by a (1+α). In this paper, we refer to such dynamics
as best-response dynamics ofmildly greedy playerswhich is discussed in Section 4.3.
3 Although inspired by this Theorem, the result presented in [3] does not imply Theorem 11.
4 In a symmetric game, all players have the same strategy set.
5 Roughly, this is a natural extension of the concept of the Nash equilibriumwhere each player cannot improve her payoff by a factor greater than 1+α,
if she unilaterally switches to some other strategy.
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that even finding an α-approximate Nash equilibrium is PLS-hard for general asymmetric congestion games, and thus an
α-approximate best response dynamics may take exponential number of steps before it converges to equilibria.
2. Definitions and preliminaries
A game Γ is defined by the tuple (N, (Si)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N), where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of n players, Si is a set of pure
strategies for player i, and Ui is a payoff function for player i. We call an element si of Si, a pure strategy of player i, while we
call a vector of pure strategies S = (s1, . . . , sn) a pure strategy profile. We denote the set of all possible strategy profiles by
S = S1 × · · · × Sn. The payoff function of a player i maps every strategy profile to a real number, i.e., Ui : S → R. A pure
strategy profile S ∈ S is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if for every player i, and every s′i ∈ Si
Ui(S) ≥ Ui(s′i, S−i),
where S−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn).
In order to model the selfish behavior of players, we use the notion of a state graph. Each vertex in the state graph
represents a strategy state S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), and corresponds to a pure strategy profile (e.g an allocation for a congestion
game, or a cut for a cut game) S ∈ S. The edges in the state graph correspond to best response moves by the players.
Definition 1. A state graphD = (V, E) is a directed graph, where each vertex inV corresponds to a strategy state. There is
an edge from state S to state S ′ with label j iff by letting player j play his best response in state S, the resulting state is S ′.
Observe that the state graph may contain loops. A best response walk is a directed walk in the state graph. We say that
player i plays in the best response walk P , if at least one of the edges of P has label i. Note that players play their best
responses sequentially, and not in parallel. Given a best response walk starting from an arbitrary state, we are interested in
the social value of the last state on the walk. Notice that if we do not allow every player to make a best response on a walk
P , then we cannot bound the social value of the final state with respect to the optimal solution. This follows from the fact
that the actions of a single player may be very important for producing solutions of high social value.6 Motivated by this
simple observation, we introduce the following models that capture the intuitive notion of a fair sequence of moves.
One-round walk: Consider an arbitrary ordering of all players i1, . . . , in. A walk P of length n in the state graph is a one-
round walk if for each j ∈ [n], the jth edge of P has label ij.
Covering walk: A walk P in the state graph is a covering walk if for each player i, there exists an edge of P with label i.
k-Covering walk: A walk P in the state graph is a k-covering walk if there are k covering walks P1,P2, . . . ,Pk, such that
P = (P1,P2, . . . ,Pk).
Random walk: AwalkP in the state graph is a randomwalk, if at each step the next player is chosen uniformly at random.
Random one-round walk: Letσ be anordering of players pickeduniformly at random from the set of all possible orderings.
Then, the one-round walk P corresponding to the ordering σ , is a random one-round walk.
Note that unless otherwise stated, all walks are assumed to start from an arbitrary initial state. This model has been used
by Mirrokni and Vetta [20], in the context of extensive games with complete information.
2.0.0.4. Congestion games. A congestion game is defined by a tuple (N, E, (Si)i∈N , (fe)e∈E) where N is a set of n players, E is
a set of facilities, Si ⊆ 2E is the pure strategy set for player i: a pure strategy si ∈ Si for player i is a set of facilities, and fe is
a latency function for the facility e depending on its load. We focus on linear delay functions with nonnegative coefficients;
fe(x) = aex+ be.
Let S = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ ×i∈NSi be a state (strategy profile) for a set of n players. The cost of player i, in a state S is
ci(S) = e∈si fe(ne(S)), where by ne(S) we denote the number of players that use facility e in S. The objective of a player
is to minimize its own cost. We consider as a social cost of a state S, the sum of the players’ costs and we denote it by
C(S) =i∈N ci(S) =e∈E ne(S)fe(ne(S)).
In weighted congestion games, player i has weighted demand wi. By θe(S), we denote the total load on a facility7 e in a
state S, i.e., θe(S) =i∈N|e∈si wi. The cost of a player in a state S is ci(S) =e∈si fe(θe(S)). We consider as a social cost of a
state S, the weighted sum C(S) =i∈N wici(S) =e∈E θe(S)fe(θe(S)). We will use subscripts to distinguish among players
and superscripts to distinguish among states.
A state S ∈ S is in a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if for every player i, and every s′i ∈ Si, ci(S) ≤ ci(s′i, S−i). The
optimum social state is the one with the minimum social cost.
Note that the selfish routing game is a special case of congestion games. Although we state all the results for congestion
gameswith linear latency functions, all of the results (including the lower and upper bounds) hold for selfish routing games.
2.0.0.5. Cut games. In a cut game, we are given an undirected graph G(V , E), with n vertices and edge weightsw : E(G)→
Q+. We will always assume that G is connected, simple, and does not contain loops. For each v ∈ V (G), let deg(v) be the
6 To see this, consider a player who is playing a sub-optimal path in the selfish routing game and his/her delay is much larger than the delay of any other
player in the game. In this case, the average delay of players is far from the optimum, since the delay of this player is far from its optimum. It is not hard to
see that the average delay of players does not decrease if this particular player does not improve his/her delay, the average delay of all players remain far
from the optimum.
7 Note that for the special case of identical player, i.e.,wi = w, then θe(S) = wne(S).
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degree of v, and let Adj(v) be the set of neighbors of v. Let alsowv =u∈Adj(v)wuv . A cut in G is a partition of V (G) into two
sets, T and T¯ = V (G) − T , and is denoted by (T , T¯ ). The value of a cut is the sum of the weights of edges between the two
sets T and T¯ , i.e.,

v∈T ,u∈T¯ wuv , where it is assumed thatwuv = 0 for uv /∈ E(G).
The cut game on a graph G(V , E), is defined as follows: each vertex v ∈ V (G) is a player, and the strategy of v is to chose
one side of the cut, i.e. v can chose sv = −1 or sv = 1. A strategy profile S = (s1, s2, . . . , sn), corresponds to a cut (T , T¯ ),
where T = {i|si = 1}. The payoff of player v in a strategy profile S, denoted by αv(S), is equal to the contribution of v in the
cut, i.e. αv(S) =i:si≠sv wiv . It follows that the cut value is equal to 12 v∈V αv(S). If S is clear from the context, we use αv
instead of αv(S) to denote the payoff of v. We denote the maximum value of a cut in G, by c(G). The happiness of a vertex v
is equal to

i:si≠sv wiv −

i:si=sv wiv .
We consider two social functions: the cut value and the cut value minus the value of the rest of the edges in the graph.
It is easy to see that the cut value is half the sum of the payoffs of vertices. The second social function is half the sum of the
happiness of vertices. We call the second social function, total happiness.
A state S ∈ S is in a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if for every player i, and every s′i ∈ Si, αi(S) ≥ αi(s′i, S−i). The
optimum social state is either the one with the maximum cut value, or the one that maximizes the total happiness, and it
will become clear from the context which of them is considered.
3. Congestion games
In this section, we focus on the convergence to approximate solutions8 in congestion gameswith linear latency functions.
It is known [21,24] that any best-response walk on the state graph leads to a pure Nash equilibrium, and a pure equilibrium
is a constant-factor approximate solution [2,9,8]. Unless otherwise stated, we assume without loss of generality, that the
players’ ordering is 1, . . . , n.
3.1. Upper bounds for one-round walks
In this section, we bound the total delay after one round of best responses of players. First, we prove that starting from
an arbitrary state, the solution after one round of best responses is a Θ(n)-approximate solution. We will also prove that
starting from an empty state, the approximation factor after one round of best responses is a constant factor. This shows
that the assumption about the initial state is critical for this problem. Our results hold for affine latencies with nonnegative
coefficients, i.e. fe(x) = aex+ be.
Theorem 1. Starting from an arbitrary initial state S0 = (s01, . . . , s0n), any one-round walk P leads to a state Sn = (sn1, . . . , snn)
that has approximation ratio O(n).
Proof. Let X = (x1, . . . , xn) be the optimal allocation, that is the allocation that minimizes the social cost, and let
S i = (sn1, . . . , sni , s0i+1, . . . , s0n) be an intermediate state of thewalk, where exactly the first i players have already participated
in the walk.
By ke(S i), we denote the number of the players in {i+1, . . . , n}, using facility e in a state S i. Notice that ke(S i) is decreasing
w.r.t. i, and in fact
ke(S i) =

ke(S i−1)− 1, e ∈ s0i
ke(S i−1), otherwise.
We denote by K(S i), the sum of the costs incurred to the players in {i + 1, . . . , n}, if those were alone in the game, i.e.
K(S i) = e∈E ke(S i)fe(ke(S i)). Finally, we denote by me(S i) the number of the players in {1, . . . , i} that use facility e in a
state S i. Clearly ne(S i) = me(S i)+ ke(S i).
The term K(S i) can be rewritten recursively, as follows
K(S i) =

e∈E
ke(S i)fe(ke(S i))
=

e∈E\s0i
ke(S i−1)fe(ke(S i−1))+

e∈s0i
(ke(S i−1)− 1)fe(ke(S i−1)− 1)
= K(S i−1)−

e∈Si
(2aeke(S i−1)− ae + be).
Using the above, we can express the social cost of the initial configuration, by
C(S0) = K(S0) =

e∈E
ke(S0)fe(ke(S0)) =

i∈N

e∈s0i
(2aeke(S i−1)− ae + be). (1)
When in state S i−1, player i selects his best-response strategy sni , moving to state S i. This means that he prefers s
n
i to xi,
i.e. ci(sni , S
i
−i) ≤ ci(xi, S i−i).
8 In this section we focus onminimization problems, therefore a ρ-approximate solution S satisfies C(S) ≤ ρ ·OPT , where OPT is the optimal social cost.
ρ ≥ 1 is the approximation ratio of the solution.
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But since the latencies are of the form fe(x) = aex+ be,
ci(sni , S
i
−i) =

e∈sni ∪s0i
fe(ne(S i−1))+

e∈sni \s0i
fe(ne(S i−1)+ 1)
=

e∈sni
(aene(S i−1)+ be)+

e∈sni \s0i
ae,
giving
e∈sni
(aene(S i−1)+ be)+

e∈sni \s0i
ae ≤

e∈xi
(ae(ne(S i−1)+ 1)+ be). (2)
For every intermediate state S i, the social cost is
C(S i) = C(S i−1)+

e∈sni \s0i
(2aene(S i−1)+ ae + be)+

e∈s0i \sni
(ae − be − 2aene(S i−1)).
Summing over all intermediate states and using (1) and (2) we get
C(Sn) = C(S0)+

i∈N

e∈sni \s0i
(2aene(S i−1)+ ae + be)+

i∈N

e∈s0i \sni
(ae − be − 2aene(S i−1))
=

i∈N

e∈sni \s0i
(2aene(S i−1)+ ae + be)+

i∈N

e∈s0i
(2aeke(S i−1)− ae + be)+

i∈N

e∈s0i \sni
(ae − be − 2aene(S i−1))
=

i∈N

e∈sni \s0i
(2aene(S i−1)+ ae + be)+

i∈N

e∈s0i ∩sni
(2aeke(S i−1)− ae + be)−

i∈N

e∈s0i \sni
2aeme(S i−1)
≤

i∈N

e∈sni
(2aene(S i−1)+ be)+

i∈N

e∈sni \s0i
ae
≤ 2

i∈N

e∈sni
(fe(ne(S i−1))+

i∈N

e∈sni \s0i
ae

≤

i∈N

e∈xi
fe(ne(S i−1)+ 1)
≤

i∈N

e∈xi
2fe(n+ 1)
=

e∈E
2ne(X)fe(n+ 1)
= O(n)C(X). 
In the next section, we will show that the above bound is tight up to a constant factor.
As mentioned earlier, the assumption about the initial state is critical for this problem. We will call empty, the state
where no player has selected any of her strategies. One could think of the empty state as the state before the actual game
begins.9 Note that the one-round walk starting from an empty state is essentially equivalent to the greedy algorithm for
a generalized scheduling problem, where a task may be assigned into many machines. Suri et al. [26,27] address similar
questions for the special case of the congestion games where the available strategies are single sets. They give a 3.08 lower
bound and a 17/3 ≈ 5.67 upper bound. For the special case of identical facilities (equal speedmachines) they give an upper
bound of (φ+1)
2
φ
≈ 4.24. We extend this result for our much more general setting.10 The following lemma will be used in
the analysis.
Lemma 1. For every pair of nonnegative integers α, β it holds
2αβ + 2β − α ≤ 1
φ + 1α
2 + (φ + 1)β2,
where φ = 1+
√
5
2 is the golden ratio.
9 Potentially, one could model the empty state by adding a dummy strategy (by creating a high cost facility) to the strategy set of each player with very
high cost. The empty state would be the state where all players play this dummy strategy.
10 Recently, Bilò et al. [5] showed a matching lower bound.
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Proof. It is easier to verify the truth of the statement if we rewrite the inequality as follows
α − (φ + 1)β + φ + 1
2
2
+ φβ − (φ + 1)
2
4
≥ 0.
Since the expression φβ − (φ+1)24 , takes positive values for β ≥ 2, we only have to check the inequality for β = 0 and
β = 1. For β = 0 it holds as
α + φ + 1
2
2
− (φ + 1)
2
4
≥ 0,
and for β = 1
α − φ + 1
2
2
+ φ − 2
4
≥ 0,
as α is an integer and so the minimum value of the squared expression is (1− (φ + 1)/2)2 = ((1− φ)/2)2 (taken for
α = 1). But
1− φ
2
2
+ φ − 2
4
= 0. 
Theorem 2. Starting from the empty state S0, any one-round walk P leads to a state Sn that has approximation ratio of at most
(φ+1)2
φ
≈ 4.24.
Proof. Here we abuse a bit the notation, and we denote by S i = (sn1, . . . , sni−1, sni ) the i-th state ofP (starting from S0), after
player i, chooses its best response link. Let X = (x1, . . . , xn) be the optimal or any other allocation. In state S i−1, player i’s
best response is sni which leads to state S
i. So we have ci(S i) ≤ ci(S i−1, xi) where (S i−1, xi) is the state produced if player i
chooses strategy xi. This finally gives
e∈sNi
aene(S i−1) ≤

e∈xi
(aene(S i−1)+ ae + be)−

e∈sni
(ae + be). (3)
Using inequality (3), we can bound the social cost of an intermediate state S i as follows:
C(S i) =

e∈E
ne(S i)fe(ne(S i))
=

e∈E−sni
ne(S i−1)fe(ne(S i−1))+

e∈sni
(ne(S i−1)+ 1)fe(ne(S i−1)+ 1)
= C(S i−1)+

e∈sni
(2aene(S i−1)+ ae + be)
≤ C(S i−1)+ 2

e∈xi
(aene(S i−1)+ ae + be)−

e∈sni
(ae + be).
Summing up these inequalities for all intermediate states S i for all i ∈ N and using Lemma 1, we get
C(Sn) ≤ C(S0)+ 2

i∈N

e∈xi
(aene(S i−1)+ ae + be)−

i∈N

e∈sni
(ae + be)
≤ 2

i∈N

e∈xi
(aene(Sn)+ ae + be)−

i∈N

e∈sni
(ae + be)
= 2

e∈E
ne(X)(aene(Sn)+ ae + be)−

e∈E
ne(Sn)(ae + be)
≤

e∈E
ae(2ne(X)ne(Sn)+ 2ne(X)− ne(Sn))+

e∈E
be(2ne(X)− ne(Sn))
≤

e∈E
ae

1
φ + 1n
2
e (S
n)+ (φ + 1)ne(X)2

+

e∈E
be(2ne(X)− ne(Sn))
≤ 1
φ + 1C(S
n)+ (φ + 1)C(X)
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which finally gives
C(Sn) ≤ (φ + 1)
2
φ
C(X) ≈ 4.24C(X). 
Now we turn our attention to weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, where player i has weighted
demandwi. Fotakis et al. [15] showed that this game with linear latency functions is a potential game.
Theorem 3. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, starting from the initial empty state S0, any one-round
walk P leads to a state Sn that has approximation ratio of at most (1+√3)2 ≈ 7.46.
Proof. Again here we abuse the notation and we denote by S i = (sn1, . . . , sni−1, sni ) the i-th state ofP (starting from S0), after
player i chooses its best response link. Let X = (x1, . . . , xn) be the optimal allocation. In state S i−1, player i’s best response is
sni and it leads to state S
i. Thus we have ci(S i) ≤ ci(S i−1, xi)where (S i−1, xi) is the state produced if player i chooses strategy
xi. This finally gives
e∈sni
(aeθe(S i−1)+ aewi + be) ≤

e∈xi
(aeθe(S i−1)+ aewi + be).
Multiplying both parts bywi, we get
e∈sni
(aeθe(S i−1)+ aewi + be)wi ≤

e∈xi
(aeθe(S i−1)+ aewi + be)wi. (4)
Using (4), we can bound the social cost of an intermediate state S i as follows:
C(S i) =

e∈E
θe(S i)fe(θe(S i))
=

e∈E−sni
θe(S i−1)fe(θe(S i−1))+

e∈sni
(θe(S i−1)+ wi)fe(θe(S i−1)+ wi)
= C(S i−1)+

e∈sii
(2aeθe(S i−1)wi + aew2i + bewi)
≤ C(S i−1)+ 2

e∈xi
(aeθe(S i−1)+ aewi + be)wi.
Summing up these inequalities for all intermediate states for all players i ∈ N and using the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,
we get:
C(Sn) ≤ C(S0)+ 2

i∈N

e∈xi
(aeθe(S i−1)+ aewi + be)wi
≤ 2

i∈N

e∈xi
(aeθe(Sn)+ aewi + be)wi
≤ 2

e∈E
aeθe(Sn)θe(X)+ 2

e∈E
(aeθ2e (X)+ beθe(X))
≤ 2

e∈E
aeθ2e (Sn)

e∈E
aeθ2e (X)+ 2C(X)
≤ 2C(Sn)C(X)+ 2C(X).
After dividing by C(X) and setting x =

C(Sn)
C(X) , we get x
2 ≤ 2x+ 2, which gives
C(Sn) ≤ (1+√3)2C(X) ≈ 7.46C(X). 
3.2. Lower bounds
In this section, we give lower bounds for the approximation factor of a state resulting after a one-round deterministic
best-response walk. The next theorem shows that the result of Theorem 1 is tight. It also justifies why it is necessary to
consider walks starting from the empty state, in order to achieve constant upper bounds.
Theorem 4. For any n > 0, there exists an n-player instance of the unweighted congestion game, an initial state S0, and a
one-round walk that results to anΩ(n)-approximate solution.
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Proof. Consider a game with 2n− 1 players and 2n− 1 facilities. Each facility e incurs cost fe(x) = x. The strategy set for a
player i is Si = {{i}, {n}}, for i ≤ n and Si = {{1, . . . , n− 1}, {i}}, for i > n. At the initial allocation S0, every player plays his
first strategy. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, at step i, player i selects his best response. During the one-round walk in which we let
player 1, . . . , n play their best response, all the players i ≤ nwill deviate to strategy {n} and the rest will deviate to strategy
{i}. After one round, the cost of the allocation is n2 + n − 1 while the optimal allocation (where every player plays {i}) has
cost 2n− 1. 
We next extend Theorem 4 for the case of t-covering walks, for t > 1.
Theorem 5. For any t > 0, and for any sufficiently large n > 0, there exists an n-player instance of the unweighted congestion
game, an initial state S0, and an ordering σ of the players, such that starting from S0, after t rounds where the players play
according to σ , the cost of the resulting allocation is a (n/t)ϵ-approximation, where ϵ = 2−O(t).
Proof. Let k > 0 be a sufficiently large integer. Let X =t+1i=1 Xi be a set of players where Xi = {xi,j}|Xi|−1j=0 . Let P =t+1i=0 Pi be
a set of facilities where Pi = {pi,j}|Pi|−1j=0 . Each facility e incurs cost fe(x) = x. Let |P0| = n0 and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t + 1}, let|Xi| = |Pi| = ni where ni is a value to be determined later. The players in X are ordered in σ so that player xi,j plays before
player xi′,j′ , iff i < i′, or i = i′, and j < j′.
Each player has two strategies. The first strategy of player xi,j is to play a single facility from the set Pi−1 while her second
strategy is to play αi facilities from the set Pi, where αi will be specified later. Formally, the strategies of player xi,j are:
• {pi−1,j mod ni−1}, and• {pi,j mod ni , pi,j+1 mod n, . . . , pi,j+αi−1 mod ni}.
We set n0 = 1 and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t + 1}, we set ni = kii−1j=1 αj−ij , and αi = k2−i−ϵi , where ϵi = 2i−2t−3. It is
straightforward to verify that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t + 1}, k < ni < k2. Thus, the total number of players is n = O(tk2).
We start by computing an upper bound for the cost of an optimal allocation. Consider a state S ′ in which every player
plays its second strategy. It is easy to see that in this allocation, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t+1}, the ni players in Xi share uniformly
the ni facilities in Pi. That is, each facility in Pi is shared by αi players of Xi. Thus, each player in Xi pays α2i , and the total cost
is
C(S ′) =
t+1
i=1
α2i ni =
t+1
i=1
k2(2
−i−ϵi)ki
i−1
j=1
(k2−j−ϵj)j−i =
t+1
i=1
k2−2ϵi+
i−1
j=1(i−j)ϵj .
Observe that 2ϵi > 2−2t−3 +i−1j=1(i− j)ϵj. Thus, we obtain
C(S ′) <
t+1
i=1
k2−2
−2t−3 = (t + 1)k2−2−2t−3 .
We will now compute the cost of the strategy profile resulting after t rounds, starting from a specific state. For each
r ∈ {0, . . . , t}, let Sr be the state resulting after r rounds. In the initial state S0, all the players play their first strategy. We
will show inductively that in Sr , all the players in
t−r+1
i=1 Xi still play their first strategy.
The assertion is clearly true for r = 0. Assume now that the assertion holds for each r < r ′, and consider the round r = r ′.
In the beginning of this round, the state is Sr−1. Consider a player xi,j, with i ≤ t − r + 1. By the induction hypothesis, in the
beginning of round r , each player in Xi+1 plays its first strategy. Since each player in Xi+1 plays after player xi,j, it follows that
this is also true when xi,j plays. This means that all the ni+1 players in Xi+1 share uniformly the ni facilities of Pi. Since each
player in Xi+1 plays a single facility in its first strategy, it follows that each facility in Pi is being shared by ni+1/ni players in
Xi+1. Also, each player in Xi plays in its second strategy αi facilities in Pi. Thus, the cost of the second strategy for player xi,j
is at least α2i
ni+1
ni
= k αi
α1α2...αi−1 .
On the other hand, it follows by the inductive hypothesis that all the facilities in Pi−1 are shared only by players in Xi.
Since each player in Xi plays a single facility in Pi−1, it follows that each of the ni−1 facilities in Pi−1 is being shared by ni/ni−1
players in Xi. Thus, the cost of the first strategy of player xi,j is
ni
ni−1 = k 1α1α2...αi .
Thus the cost of the second strategy is greater than the cost of the first strategy. This implies that for each i ≤ t − r + 1,
each player in Xi plays her first strategy after the end round r , and the inductive claim follows.
By the above argument it follows that after t rounds, each player in X1 plays her first strategy. That is, all of the k players
in X1 share the single facility of P0. It follows that C(St) ≥ k2. Thus, the ratio between the cost of St , and the cost of an
optimal allocation is at least C(St)/C(S ′) > k2−2t−3/(t + 1). Since n = (tk2), it follows that the approximation ratio is at
least (n/t)2
−O(t)
. 
Finally, we strengthen Theorem4 by showing that there are instances forwhich the cost of the solution after any arbitrary
one-round walk is anΩ(n)-approximate solution.
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Theorem 6. For any n > 0, there exists an 2n-player instance of the unweighted congestion game, and an initial state S0 such
that for any one-round walk P starting from S0, the state at the end of P is anΩ(n)-approximate solution.
Proof. Consider 2n players and 2n+2 facilities {0, 1, . . . , 2n+1}. Each facility e incurs cost fe(x) = x. The available strategies
for each player i of the first n players are {{0}, {i}, {n+ 1, . . . , 2n}} and for the n last {{2n+ 1}, {i}, {1, . . . , n}}. In the initial
allocation, every player plays its third strategy. Consider any order on the players and let them begin to choose their best
responses. It is easy to see that in the first steps, the players would prefer their first strategy. If this happens until the end of
the round, the resulting cost isΩ(n2). Thus, we can assume that at some step, the (k+ 1)-st player from the set {1, . . . , n}
prefers his second strategy while all the previous k players of the same set have chosen their first strategies. The status of
the game at this step is as follows: k players of the first group play their first strategy, m players of the second group play
their first strategy and the remaining players play their initial strategy. Since player k + 1 prefers his second strategy, this
means k = n−m and so one of them, k is at least n/2. The cost at the end will thus be at leastm2+ k2+ n = Ω(n2). On the
other hand, in the optimal allocation everybody chooses its second strategy which gives cost 2n. Thus, the approximation
ratio isΩ(n). 
4. Cut games: the cut social function
4.1. Fast convergence on random walks
First we prove positive results for the convergence to constant-factor approximate solutions with random walks. We
show that the expected value of the cut after a random one-round walk is within a constant factor of the maximum cut.
Theorem 7. In weighted graphs, the expected value of the cut at the end of a random one-roundwalk is at least 18 of themaximum
cut.
Proof. By linearity of expectation, it suffices to show that after a random one-roundwalk, for every v ∈ V (G), E[αv] ≥ 18wv .
Let v be a vertex, k ∈ {0, . . . , deg(v)}, and let Xkv denote the event that v occurs after exactly k of its neighbors. Clearly,
Pr[Xkv ] =
1
deg(v)+ 1 .
After v moves, the contribution of v in the cut is at least wv2 . Let u be a vertex in the neighborhood of v, and let Yu>v denote
the event that u appears after v. Then,
Pr[Yu>v|Xkv ] =
deg(v)− k
deg(v)
.
Note that the move of u can decrease the contribution of v by at most wuv , and this can happen only when the event Yu>v
occurs, i.e. when u appears after v. Thus
E[αv|Xkv ] ≥ max

0, wv ·

1
2
− deg(v)− k
deg(v)

.
We have
E[αv] =
deg(v)
k=0
E[αv|Xkv ] · Pr[Xkv ]
≥
deg(v)
k=0
1
deg(v)+ 1 ·max

0, wv ·

1
2
− deg(v)− k
deg(v)

= wv
deg(v)+ 1
⌊ deg(v)2 ⌋+1
k=0
2k− deg(v)
2deg(v)
≥ wv
8
.
Thus the expected contribution of v in the cut is at least max(0, wv( 12 − deg(v)−kdeg(v) )). Summing over all values of k, we
obtain E[αv] ≥deg(v)k=0 1deg(v)+1 max(0, wv( 12 − deg(v)−kdeg(v) )) = wvdeg(v)+1 

deg(v)
2

+1
k=0
2k−deg(v)
2deg(v) ≥ wv8 . 
The next theorem studies a random walk of best responses (not necessarily a one-round walk).
Theorem 8. There exists a constant c > 0 such that the expected value of the cut at the end of a random walk of length cn log n
is a constant-factor of the maximum cut.
Proof. Let G(V , E) be a weighted graph, and let X = x1, x2, . . . , xk be a sequence, where each xi is chosen uniformly and
independently at random from V (G). Using coupon collecting arguments (see e.g. [1]), there exists a constant c , such that if
G. Christodoulou et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 438 (2012) 13–27 23
k = cn log n, then X contains each element of V (G)with probability 1− 1
n3
. By the union bound, all vertices occur in X with
probability 1− 1
n2
. Thus, it is sufficient to prove the assertion conditioning on the fact that all vertices occur in X .
Assume now that X contains all the elements of V (G), and for each v ∈ V (G) let t(v) be the largest i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k,
such that xi = v. Consider now the subsequence X ′ of X , such that X ′ contains only those elements xi, such that i = t(v),
for some v ∈ V (G). By symmetry, it follows that the distribution of the random variable X ′ is invariant under permutations
of the vertices in V (G). Thus, X ′ induces a random one-round walk. Observe that for xt(u), xt(v) ∈ X ′, with t(u) < t(v), we
know that after vertex v plays, the contribution of v in the cut that is due to the edge {u, v} cannot change. Therefore, by
applying the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 7, the assertion follows. 
4.2. Poor deterministic convergence
Wenowgive lower bounds for the convergence to approximate solutions for the cut social function. First,we give a simple
example for which we need at least Ω(n) rounds of best responses to converge to a constant-factor cut. The construction
resembles a result of Poljak [23].
Theorem 9. There exists a weighted graph G(V , E), with |V (G)| = n, and an ordering of vertices such that for any k > 0, the
value of the cut after k rounds of letting players play in this ordering is at most O(k/n) of the maximum cut.
Proof. Consider a graph G(V , E), with V (G) = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and E(G) = i−1i=1{{i, i + 1}}. For any i, with 1 ≤ i < n,
the weight of the edge {i, i + 1}, is 1 + (i − 1)/n2. Since G is bipartite, the value of the maximum cut of G is c(G) =n−1
i=1 (1+ (i− 1)/n2) = Ω(n).
Let σ be an ordering of the vertices of G, with σ(i) = i. Consider the execution of the one-round walk for the ordering σ .
Initially, we have T = V (G). It is easy to see that in any round i ≥ 1, when vertex j plays, if j ≤ n − i, jmoves to the other
part of the cut. Otherwise, if j > n− i, j remains in the same part of the cut. Thus, after round i, we have
T =
{n, n− 2, n− 4, . . . , n− i+ 1} if i is odd
{1, 2, . . . , n− i− 1)} ∪ {n, n− 2, n− 4, . . . , n− i} if i is even.
It easily follows that the size of the cut after k rounds according to the ordering σ , is
n−1
i=n−k 1+ (i− 1)/n2 = O(k). 
We next combine a modified version of the above construction with a result of Schaffer and Yannakakis for the Max-Cut
local search problem [28], to obtain an exponentially-long walk with poor cut value.
Theorem 10. There exists a weighted graph G(V , E), with |V (G)| = Θ(n), and a k-covering walkP in the state graph, for some
k exponentially large in n, such that the value of the cut at the end of P , is at most O(1/n) of the optimum cut.
Proof. In [28], it is shown that there exists a weighted graph G0(V , E), and an initial cut (T0, T¯0), such that the length of any
walk in the state graph, from (T0, T¯0) to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, is exponentially long. Consider such a graph of
sizeΘ(n), with V (G0) = {v0, v1, . . . , vN}. LetP0 be an exponentially long walk from (T0, T¯0) to a Nash equilibrium inwhich
we let vertices v0, v1, . . . , vN play in this order for exponential an number of rounds. Let S0, S1, . . . , S|P0| be the sequence of
states visited byP0 and let yi be the vertex that plays his best response from state Si to state Si+1. The result of [28] guarantees
that there exists a vertex, say v0, which wants to change side (i.e. strategy) an exponential number of times along the walk
P0 (since otherwise we can find a small walk to a pure Nash equilibrium). Let t0 = 0, and for i ≥ 1, let ti be the time inwhich
v0 changes side for the i-th time along the walkP0. For i ≥ 1, letQi be the sequence of vertices yti−1+1, . . . , yti . Observe that
eachQi contains all of the vertices in G0.
Consider now a graph G, which consists of a path L = x1, x2, . . . , xn, and a copy of G0. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, the
weight of the edge {xi, xi+1} is 1. We scale the weights of G0, such that the total weight of the edges of G0 is less than 1.
Finally, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we add the edge {xi, v0}, of weight ϵ, for some sufficiently small ϵ. Intuitively, we can pick
the value of ϵ, such that the moves made by the vertices in G0, are independent of the positions of the vertices of the path L
in the current cut.
For each i ≥ 1, we consider an orderingRi of the vertices of L, as follows: If i is odd, thenRi = x1, x2, . . . , xn, and if i is
even, thenRi = xn, xn−1, . . . , x1.
We are now ready to describe the exponentially long path in the state graph. Assumew.l.o.g., that in the initial cut for G0,
we have v0 ∈ T0. The initial cut for G is (T , T¯ ), with T = {x1} ∪ T0, and T¯ = {x2, . . . , xn} ∪ T¯0. It is now straight-forward to
verify that there exists an exponentially large k, such that for any i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, if we let the vertices of G play according
to the sequenceQ1,R1,Q2,R2, . . . ,Qi,Ri, then we have (see Fig. 1):
• If i is even, then {v0, x1} ⊂ T , and {x2, . . . , xn} ⊂ T¯ .
• If i is odd, then {x1, . . . , xn−1} ⊂ T , and {v0, xn} ⊂ T¯ .
It follows that for each i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the size of the cut is at most O(1/n) times the value of the optimal cut. The result
follows since each walk in the state graph induced by the sequenceQi andRi is a covering walk. 
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(a) i is even. (b) i is odd.
Fig. 1. The cut (Ti, T¯i) along the walk of the proof of Theorem 10.
4.3. Mildly greedy players
By Theorem 7, it follows that for any graph, and starting from an arbitrary cut, there exists a walk of length at most n to
anΩ(1)-approximate cut. On the other hand, Theorems 9 and 10, show that there are cases where a deterministic ordering
of players may result to very long walks that do not reach an approximately good cut.
We observe that if we change the game by assuming that a vertex changes side in the cut if his payoff is multiplied by at
least a factor 1+ϵ, for a constant ϵ > 0, then the convergence is faster.We call such vertices (1+ϵ)-greedy. In the following,
we prove that if all vertices are (1 + ϵ)-greedy for a constant ϵ > 0, then the value of the cut after any one-round walk is
within a constant factor of the optimum.
Theorem 11. If all vertices are (1+ ϵ)-greedy, then the cut value at the end of any one-round walk is within amin{ 14+2ϵ , ϵ4+2ϵ }
factor of the optimal cut.
Proof. Consider a one-round walk P . For each vertex v, let α′v be the payoff of v right after its occurrence in P , and let αv
be the payoff of v at the end of P . Let V1 be the set of vertices that did not change their side in the one-round walk and
V2 = V (G) \ V1. For a vertex v ∈ V2, let rv be the total weight of the edges that are removed from the cut after v moves. For
a set T ⊆ V (G), letW (T ) = v∈T wv . Thus,v∈V (G) αv = v∈V1 αv +v∈V2 αv ≥ v∈V1 α′v +v∈V2 α′v −v∈V2 rv ≥
1
2+ϵW (V1) + 1+ϵ2+ϵW (V2) − 12+ϵW (V2) ≥ min{ 12+ϵ , ϵ2+ϵ }W (V (G)). Thus the value of the cut after this one-round walk, is at
least a min( 14+2ϵ ,
ϵ
4+2ϵ )-approximation. 
4.4. Unweighted graphs
In unweighted simple graphs, it is straight-forward to verify that the value of the cut at the end of an n2-covering walk
is at least 12 of the optimum. The following theorem shows that in unweighted graphs, the value of the cut after anyΩ(n)-
covering walk is a constant-factor approximation.
Theorem 12. For unweighted graphs, the value of the cut after anΩ(n)-coveringwalk iswithin a constant-factor of themaximum
cut.
Proof. Consider a k-covering walk P = (P1, . . . ,Pk), where each Pi is a covering walk. LetM0 = 0, and for any i ≥ 1, let
Mi be the size of the cut at the end of Pi. Note that ifMi − Mi−1 ≥ |E(G)|10n , for all i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then clearlyMk ≥ k |E(G)|10n ,
and since the maximum size of a cut is at most |E(G)|, the Lemma follows.
It remains to consider the case where there exists i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, such that Mi − Mi−1 < |E(G)|10n . Let V1 be the set of
vertices that change their side in the cut on the walkPi, and V2 = V (G) \ V1. Observe that when a vertex changes its side in
the cut, the size of the cut increases by at least 1. Thus, |V1| < |E(G)|10n , and since the degree of each vertex is at most n− 1, it
follows that the number of edges that are incident to vertices in V1, is less than
|E(G)|
10 .
On the other hand, if a vertex of degree d remains in the same part of the cut, then exactly after it plays, at least ⌈d/2⌉
of its adjacent edges are in the cut. Thus, at least half of the edges that are incident to at least one vertex in V2, were in the
cut, at some point during walkPi. At most
|E(G)|
10 of these edges have an end-point in V1, and thus at most that many of these
edges may not appear in the cut at the end of Pi. Thus, the total number of edges that remain in the cut at the end of walk
Pi, is at least
|E(G)|−|E(G)|/10
2 − |E(G)|10 = 7|E(G)|20 . Since the maximum size of a cut is at most |E(G)|, we obtain that at the end of
Pi, the value of the cut is within a constant factor of the optimum. 
Theorem 13. There exists an unweighted graph G(V , E), with |V (G)| = n, and an ordering of the vertices such that for any
k > 0, the value of the cut after k rounds of letting players play in this ordering is at most O(k/
√
n) of the maximum cut.
Proof. Let V (G) = ti=1ij=1{{vi,j}}, and E(G) = t−1i=1 ij=1i+1l=1{{vi,j, vi+1,l}}. Clearly, G is bipartite, and thus the
maximum cut value c(G) = |E(G)| = Ω(t3) = Ω(n3/2).
Consider now the ordering σ , such that for any i, j, with 1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ t , σ( i(i−1)2 + j) = vi,j. By an argument similar to
the one used in the proof of Theorem 9, we obtain that after k rounds of letting players play according to the ordering σ , the
size of the cut is at most O(kt2) = O(kn). 
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5. The total happiness social function
In this section, we consider the total happiness at the end of a random one-round walk starting from a random cut,11 for
unweighted graphs of large girth. Observe that the price of anarchy is unbounded for this social function.12 An alternative
notion for the price of anarchy is the optimistic price of anarchy, or the price of stability, which is the best ratio between the
optimum and a Nash equilibrium. For a cut game with the cut, or the total happiness social functions, it is easy to see that
the price of stability is 1.13
Note that the expected total happiness of a random cut is zero. Thus, a random cut is not an approximate solution for this
social function, even though it is a 12 -approximation for the cut social function. Here, we prove that in unweighted graphs
of large girth, starting from a random cut, the total happiness of the cut after a random one-round walk is an approximate
solution. In fact, this gives a sub-logarithmic approximation algorithm for the total happiness objective function for this
class of graphs.
Let G(V , E) be an unweighted graph. For some δ > 0, we call an edge of G, δ-good, if at least one of its end-points, has
degree at most δ. Also, we call an edge of G, δ-bad, if it is not δ-good.
Lemma 2. Let G(V , E), be a graph with |E(G)| ≤ k|V (G)|. Then, the number of δ-good edges of G, is at least δ+1−2k
δ+1 n.
Proof. Since |E(G)| ≤ kn, the average degree of G is at most 2k. If we pick a vertex v ∈ V (G), uniformly at random, we have
Pr[deg(v) ≤ δ] = 1−Pr[deg(v) ≥ δ+ 1] ≥ 1− 2k
δ+1 = δ+1−2kδ+1 . Thus, at least δ+1−2kδ+1 n vertices have degree at most δ. Since
the degree of each vertex is at least 1 (recall that G is connected), at least δ+1−2k2δ+2 n edges are adjacent to these vertices, and
all of these edges are δ-good. 
Consider the cut (T , T¯ ), at the end of a random one-roundwalk. Let≺ be the total order on the elements of V (G), defined
by the random ordering of the vertices in the random one-round walk. For each e ∈ E(G), let Xe be an indicator random
variable, such that Xe = 1, if one end-point of e is in T , and the other is in T¯ , and Xe = 0, otherwise.
For a pair u, v ∈ V (G), let Eu,v denote the event that there exists a path p = x1, x2, . . . , x|p|, with u = x1, and v = x|p|,
and for any i, with 1 ≤ i < |p|, xi ≺ xi+1.
Lemma 3. Let {u, v}, {v,w} ∈ E(G), such that u ≺ w ≺ v. Then, for any C ′ > 0, there exists a constant C, such that if the girth
of G is at least C log nlog log n , then Pr[Eu,w] < n−C
′
.
Proof. Since w ≺ v, it follows that if the event Eu,w happens, then there exists a path p = x1, x2, . . . , x|p|, which does not
visit v, with u = x1,w = x|p|, and xi ≺ xi+1, for any i, with 1 ≤ i < n.
Let g be the girth of G. Consider the subgraph G′ of G \ {v}, induced by the vertices that are at distance at most g−3 from
v. Since the length of the shortest cycle of G is at least g , it follows that G′ is a tree, and it does not contain w. Let P be the
set of all paths that start from u, have length g− 3, and do not visit v. Since G′ is a tree,P contains less than n paths. Clearly,
if a path p that satisfies the above conditions exists, then there is a path p′ ∈ P , with p = x′1, . . . , x′g−2, such that for any i,
with 1 ≤ i < g − 2, x′i ≺ x′i+1. Thus, for a sufficiently large constant C , the probability that such a path exists, is less than
n/

C log nlog log n − 3

! < n−C ′ . 
Lemma 4. For any e ∈ E(G), we have Pr[Xe = 1] ≥ 1/2− o(1).
Proof. Let e = {u, v}, and assume w.l.o.g., that u ≺ v. If u is the only neighbor of v, that precedes v, w.r.to ≺, then clearly
Pr[Xe = 1] = 1.
Assume now that there exists u′ ∈ V (G), u′ ≠ u, with {u′, v} ∈ E(G), and u′ ≺ v. By Lemma 3, it follows that Pr[Eu,u′ ∨
Eu′,u] < 2/nC ′ . Observe that if none of the events Eu,u′ , and Eu′,u happens, then the choice of the part of the cut that u belongs,
is independent of the choice of the part that u′ belongs. That is, the conditional probability that u and u′ are both in T , or T¯
is 1/2.
Since v has at most n neighbors, it follows that the probability that there exists neighbors u1, u2 of v, such that Eu1,u2
happens, is at most O(1/n). Thus, with probability at least 1 − O(1/n), none of these events happens. In this case, the
conditional probability that Xe = 1, is at least 1/2. It follows that Pr[Xe = 1] ≥ 1/2− O(1/n). 
Lemma 5. Let e = {u, v} ∈ E(G), with u ≺ v, and deg(v) ≤ δ. Then, Pr[Xe = 1] ≥ 1/2+Ω(1/
√
δ).
11 A random cut is a cut that is chosen uniformly at random from all possible cuts.
12 To see that, consider an unweighted cycle of size four, V (G) = {v1, v2, v3, v4}, and E(G) = {{v1, v2}, {v2, v3}, {v3, v4}, {v4, v1}}. Let T1 = {v1, v2}, and
T2 = {v1, v3}. Note that (T1, T¯1) is a cut of total happiness 2, and (T2, T¯2) is a Nash equilibrium of total happiness 0. Thus, the price of anarchy is 40 that is
unbounded.
13 In general, the price of stability in potential games in which the social function is a potential function for the game, is equal to 1.
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Proof. By applying the same argument of the proof of Lemma 4, we obtain that the probability that there exists neighbors
u1, u2 of v, such that Eu1,u2 happens, is at mostO(1/n). Thus, with probability at least 1−o(1), none of these events happens.
Assume now that none of these events happens. For each neighbor w, of v, let Yw be an indicator random variable, such
that Yw = 1, ifw is in the same part of the cut with u, and Yw = 0, otherwise. Let Y ={w,v}∈E(G) Yw . Since Pr[Yu = 1] = 1,
we obtain E[Y ] = (d+ 1)/2. We will consider two cases for δ.
Case 1: If δ is odd, we have Pr[{u, v} is cut] ≥ Pr[Y ≥ (δ + 1)/2] = Pr[Y = (δ + 1)/2] + Pr[Y > (δ + 1)/2]. Note
that Pr[Y = (δ + 1)/2] = 2−δ+1δ−1δ−1
2
 = Ω(1/√δ). Since Pr[Y > (δ + 1)/2] = Pr[Y < (δ + 1)/2], we obtain
Pr[{u, v} is cut] = 1/2+Ω(1/√δ).
Case 2: If δ is even, we have Pr[{u, v} is cut] = 12Pr[Y = δ/2]+Pr[Y > δ/2] = 12Pr[Y = δ/2]+ 12 . Note that Pr[Y = δ/2] =
2−δ+1

δ−1
δ
2−1
 = Ω(1/√δ). Thus, we obtain Pr[{u, v} is cut] = 1/2+Ω(1/√δ). 
Theorem 14. For any unweighted simple graph of girth at least 2 log n, starting from a random cut, the expected value of the
happiness at the end of a random one-round walk, is within a constant factor from the maximum happiness.
Proof. If G(V , E) is a graph of girth at least 2 log n, then |E(G)| ≤ 3n. Also, by Lemma 2, it follows that there are at least
n
9 , 8-good edges in G. By Lemma 4, it follows that the probability that an 8-bad edge is cut, is at least 1/2 − o(1), while by
Lemma 5, the probability that an 8-good edge is cut, is at least 1/2+Ω(1). Thus, the expectation of the total happiness after
a random one-round walk isΩ(n). 
We can similarly prove the following Theorem.
Theorem 15. There exists a constant C ′, such that for any C > C ′, and for any unweighted simple graph of girth at least C log nlog log n ,
starting from a random cut, the expected value of the happiness at the end of a random one-round walk, is within a 1
(log n)O(1/C)
factor of the maximum happiness.
Proof. We have |E(G)| ≤ n + n1+1/⌊ C log n2 log log n ⌋ < n + n1+ C log n2 log log n , and for sufficiently large n, |E(G)| = O(n log1/C n). Also, by
Lemma2, it follows that there are at leastΩ(n), log1/C n-good edges inG. By Lemma4, the probability that a log1/C n-bad edge
is cut, is at least 1/2−o(1), while by Lemma 5, the probability that a log1/C n-good edge is cut, is at least 1/2+Ω(log−1/2C n).
Thus, the expectation of the total happiness after a random one-round walk isΩ(n log−1/2C n). 
Note that the above theorem also gives a combinatorial sub-logarithmic approximation algorithm for the total happiness
problem in unweighted graphs of large girth. As mentioned before, this objective function is considered in the context of
correlation clustering problem [4] and a log(n)-approximation is recently known for this function in general graphs [6].
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